Flexible but Structured Design
Militaries are not regularly mobs of men but rather organized socio-technical systems. As technology has more impact on the way wars are fought, more detailed club will be required. Many distinct things affect troops club - tactics, training, weapon availability and deployment to name a few. Many organizations are so weighed down by politics and procedures that they are unable to effectively adapt their activities to meet the changing operational requirement. A troops club such as the U.S. Navy must have some degree of flexibility in the way it is structured in order to faultless its mission.
"The crux of organizational competence is adaptability - and adaptability depends upon the potential of the club to easily modify its operations as required by changes in its objectives, its missions, and its environments, (i. E. It flexibility)." (Olmstead, 2002, p. 219).The Navy's mission statement is very adaptable to today's rapidly changing environment. The mission of the Navy is to "maintain, train and equip combat-ready naval troops capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas." In order to withhold this mission, the operating troops commanders and fleet commanders have a dual chain of command - menagerial and operational.
![]( "Strategic Enterprise: Transforming Today's Navy for Tomorrow's Environment")
Operationally, they furnish naval troops and report to the standard Unified Combatant Commanders. As ships enter the area of responsibility for a singular geographical area, they are operationally assigned to the standard fleet (2nd Fleet - Atlantic Ocean, 3rd Fleet - Pacific Ocean, 6th Fleet - Mediterranean, etc.). Administratively, they report to the Chief of Naval Operations and provide, train, and equip naval forces. Ships also report to the standard type commander.
Organizational Design
According to Galbraith (2002), "Organizational designs that facilitate variety, change, speed, and integration are sources of contentious advantages." (p. 6). The Navy's organizational designs of operational and menagerial chains of commands are supplementary supported by a type commander, which provides information, support, and training to withhold both the menagerial and operational commanders. All naval units report to commanders based unit type. Aircraft carriers, aircraft squadrons, and air stations are under the menagerial control of the standard Commander Naval Air Force. Submarines come under the Commander Submarine Force. All other ships fall under Commander Naval covering Force. The type commanders are supplementary defined by Atlantic and Pacific Fleets which mirror one another. The focus of this strategic make pathology is to seek the organizational make-up for covering Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Surflant) who is administratively responsible for all covering warships in the Atlantic Fleet.
Surflant, one of the six United States Naval Type Commands, consists of 110+ ships; there are extra mission and fleet withhold units that make up the more than 40 commands. Surflant has almost 35, 000 personnel are stationed both Stateside from Bath, Maine to Corpus Christi, Texas and on the high seas from the Norwegian Sea in the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf of the Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, Surflant ships furnish a indispensable element to drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean Sea.
Mission Statement Analysis
The mission of Surflant is "to furnish combat ready ships to the fleet; and furnish those ships and supporting commands with the leadership, manpower, equipment, maintenance, training, and material needed to perform operational excellence and escort prompt, sustained combat operations at sea to ensure victory." This statement defines the principle stock that Surflant must deliver as well as the elements required by the customer. The principle stock that must be delivered is "combat ready ships" and he buyer is "the fleet" or operational commander. Surflant must furnish indispensable resources before these ships are "combat ready" or beneficial to the operational commander: Leadership, Manpower & Training, and Logistics withhold - includes equipment, maintenance, and materials. The potential to deliver these resources is affected by internal and external factors.
Internal & External Environment Analysis
There are internal and external factors that affect Surflant's potential to deliver combat ready ships to the fleet. A manning external factor, for example, would be the impact of an aircraft controller rotating from the shore preparation to a ship early in order to withhold the ship's mission when air operations are required. An internal leadership factor would be the ship's commanding officer properly training his sailors so that they function as a crew when fighting the ship. Each of the requirements has their own unique set of internal and external factors. I will not exertion to discuss each requirement in relation to these internal/external factors, but rather focus on the inquire signal from the end user (operational commander) and how that signal drives the process of preparation hips for operational commitments in hostile environments.
The demands of the Global War on Terrorism have underscored the need for troops that can quickly be deployed to any "dark projection of the world," and arrive ready for the entire range of combat operations. This "War on Terrorism" is a campaign by the Nato governments and their allies' governments with the stated goal of ending international terrorism by stopping those groups identified by the U.S. As terrorist groups and ending state sponsorship of terrorism. The "War on Terrorism" was launched in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington D.C. It has come to be a central part of U.S. Foreign and domestic policy. Unlike earlier concepts and definitions of war--with defined nations, boundaries, standing armies, and navies--the "War on Terrorism" has largely been dominated by the use of extra forces, intelligence, police work, and diplomacy. In 2005, the Us' strategic goals have been expanded, from fighting a war on terrorism to fighting "The Long War." More recently, members of the Us-government also used the labels "Global Struggle against Violent Extremism" and "World War Iii".
As the environment changes, we must evolve to meet these new challenges. "Our warfighting requirement decisions are driven by the current and hereafter threats, naval strategy, affordability and joint interoperability." (Nathman, 1999). Before the events of 9/11, the naval view of protection was very basic and required only standard methods of training and equipment. After 9/11 the navy bolstered its view of protection that is now known as Anti-Terrorism/Force protection which brought with it new training requirements, leadership development requirements, and supplementary logistics requirements such as improved body armor. The bottom line is though our mission statement remains unchanged, the inquire signal or threat environment compelled us to correlate and adjust how we fulfill our mission.
The inquire Signal
In the past the U.S. Navy has fought big wars, massed enough might to fight major wars on two fronts, fought giants such as Germany and Japan, and staved off Russia while the cold war. While preparation for such warfare, the U.S. Navy has increasingly engaged in smaller-scale operations such as fighting insurgencies, combating terrorism, rescuing noncombatants from war zones, supporting amiable governments, rendering humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, participating in peacekeeping operations, as well as other challenges other than war.
The widely diversified and specialized Naval covering Force Atlantic is an foremost instrument of national procedure in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean Sea, Caribbean Sea, and the Persian Gulf." Surflant ensures covering ships over are properly trained, maintained and crewed to withhold troops operations with other U.S. Services, and with amiable nations everywhere in the world. We will furnish operational commanders with well trained, very effective, and technologically relevant covering troops that are certified over the full spectrum of warfare areas.
The demands of war underscore the need for troops that can quickly be deployed to any dark projection of the world, and arrive ready for the entire range of combat operations. The "War on Terrorism" was launched in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York ad Washington D.C. It has come to be a central part of U.S. Foreign and domestic policy. Unlike earlier concepts and definitions of war - with defined nations, boundaries, standing armies, and navies - the "War of Terrorism" has largely been dominated by the use of extra Forces, intelligence, police work, and diplomacy.
The End Product
To withhold the forward preventative and rapid response requirements of today, organizational constructs such as the attack Group (Csg) and Expeditionary attack Group (Esg) have been instituted as key components of the global integrated naval force. Organizing naval deployments colse to Esgs and Csgs has increased the whole of independently employable naval attack groups that furnish Regional Combatant Commanders with greater operational freedom and scalable joint response options. attack groups are formed and disestablished on an as-needed basis, and one may be distinct from another. However, they all are comprised of similar types of ships. Typically a carrier attack group might have an Aircraft Carrier, a Guided Missile Cruiser, two or three Guided Missile Destroyers, a Los Angeles-Class attack Submarine, a Combat Air Wing, and a Supply-Class Replenishment Ship. The Csg could be employed in a range of roles, all of which would involve the gaining and maintenance of sea supremacy.
The Expeditionary attack Group (Esg) centers on the flexibility and readiness of a combined expeditionary force. The total Esg provides operational freedom and expanded warfare capabilities, not only by land with embarked Marines, but at sea, as well. The exact make-up of an Expeditionary attack Group is in the process of being defined, but mostly consists of an Amphibious attack Ship, an Amphibious transport Dock Ship, a Dock Landing Ship, a Guided Missile Cruiser, two or three Guided Missile Destroyers, a Frigate, an attack Submarine, a nautical Expeditionary Unit, and a range of combat air withhold aircraft such as helicopters.
This organizational make is very sufficient in meeting the current needs of the operational commanders. Surflant ships and their Sailors deploy colse to the world to furnish "forward presence," helping to utter regional stability in such potentially volatile areas as the Arabian Gulf. By contributing to stability, covering units utter open economic markets and laid out democratic principles. In today's worldwide economy, covering ships operating overseas benefit Americans at home every day.
New Horizons: Global view of Operations
The U.S. Navy met the challenges of the Cold War by employing the Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups, which is very similar to the Csg/Esg strategy of today. In order to meet this Global War on Terrorism we must transform our force to meet global challenges by implementing a new Global view of Operations. Operational success in the hereafter will be dependent upon the potential of naval troops to collect indispensable regions for U.S. troops using technologically advanced ships and innovative employment concepts. Potential adversaries who rely on these regions for political, military, and market power have advanced cheap naval mines, Fast attack Craft, and torpedo-armed diesel submarines to deny or limit U.S. troops entrance to these regions. development of enhanced combat capabilities designed to control effectively in hostile environments is indispensable to long-term continued dominance.
As Potential adversaries collect cheap, sufficient weapons to deny entrance to indispensable regions, the U.S. Navy must look to make new operational constructs that supports increased global presence. We must evolve in the way we think, plan, and wage war from the sea by leveraging technology for the information age and apply it to the realities of the 21st century threat. Specifically, there are two areas of evolution where the U.S Navy should focus: network centric warfare and innovative employment strategies.
Network Centric Warfare
The Navy has its own singular cultural dynamics, which differs in contexts, structures, and power relations from society. Any argument of socio-technical convert must also identify an overarching set of beliefs and assumptions about technology that informs the processes of adaptation. Technology is not 'merely' a range of bits and pieces, components, or make elements. McLaughlin (1999) contends "[Technology] should be regarded as an ensemble, whose component parts and their compound are held together by public relations among people, as much as by more bodily ties such as screws, bolts or electrons." (p. 2). The public and technical systems must consolidate and aid one another. We must harness the emerging information technologies to enable a basal convert in the way our navy operates. This is called Network Centric Warfare, and it may be the most dramatic convert in naval warfare since the coming of carrier aviation.
In simple terms, network centric warfare refers to the systems and processes for providing fully networked, naval command and control. The objective is to furnish commanders the means to make better, timelier decisions than they currently can and to allow the sufficient performance of those decisions. The basal factory from which network centric warfare gets its power is the network effect, which causes the value of a stock or service in a network to growth exponentially as the whole of those using it increases. The more units a weapon theory can support, the more indispensable is the weapon. The more decision-makers a sensor can withhold with beneficial information, the more indispensable is the sensor. The more commanders, staffs, units, platforms, weapons and sensors are associated together in a network structure, the more noteworthy will be the network. This view envisions thorough connectivity among network elements--greater by orders of magnitude than previously achieved. Since most headquarters are already well connected, the real power in network centric warfare is in connecting the extremities of the force--people, weapons, sensors, platforms, munitions, shipments, parts, and so on. An objective of is extending visibility and empowerment of the extremities. "Network connectivity will furnish all nodes, naval and non-naval alike, greater entrance to information, which will come to be the base asset of the network." (Alberts and Hayes, 2003, p. 23).
Innovative Employment Techniques
The U.S. Navy must be prepared to challenge Potential adversaries in any threat environment. Agreeing to Johnson, Libicki, and Treverton (2003) "The convert from a fairly predictable, symmetrical threat to the myriad unpredictable, asymmetrical threats Potential has profound effects for defense planning."(p. 10). They also propose that this convert impels a shift from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning and propose a "portfolio " arrival to new capabilities (i.e., trying to build breadth and flexibility in the hope that capabilities can be brought to bear over a spectrum of unpredictable threats --would be the most beneficial type)." (P. 10-11).
Historically, the Navy has been a big-ship, "blue-water" Navy. This "blue-water" Navy was designed to control far from coastal waters and to be station for long periods of time. Nuclear-powered carriers, the Joint Task Force and Csg/Esg constructs, and a long logistical tail supplementary supported the power projection capabilities of the U.S. "blue water" Navy. Admiral Mullen envisions a Navy that will control as a "blue water" force but as a "brown water" and "green water" force as well.
By contrast, "brown water" Navy takes the fight to the enemy's inland waterways, riverine systems, and close coastal littoral environments. The U.S. Navy originated this term, and it refers to the small gunboats and patrol boats used in river systems. River gunboats and Pt boats used while World War Ii were the forerunners of the "brown water" Naval concept. while the Vietnam War, our "brown water" force was a joint exertion between the Navy and Army and patrolled the inland waterways and deltas. This "brown water" engagement was thought about largely flourishing and indispensable due the region's many inland waterways and large coastline.
The urgent need to furnish withhold for global littoral and amphibious operations compels the U.S. Navy to convert faster than any other branch of the armed forces. Navy platforms will be increasingly engaged in operations in the littoral--areas close to land and choke points where Potential adversaries will exertion to take benefit of opportunities afforded by the proliferation of cheap and sufficient weapons. The continued evolution of Naval systems for littoral warfare will be advanced using a base thread -- off-board vehicles, stealth, and precision weapons. Unmanned vehicles - surface, undersea, and aerial - will have a progressively more foremost role in naval warfare. Unmanned aerial vehicles (Uav) will be employed over the mission spectrum in reconnaissance, support, and then in selected lethal roles in Over-the-Horizon Targeting. Unmanned underwater vehicles (Uuvs) will reduce the risk to covering units while conducting mine clearance, and Unmanned covering Vehicles (Usv) will enlarge the battle space significantly and add mission abilities of great point in the areas of covering warfare.
Becoming the Agile Organization
Globalization is captivating the way organizations think and the way citizen interact within the club as well as over organizational ties. citizen are no longer isolated within our departments and this new connectedness brings with it new responsibilities. For instance, it's difficult for deployed sailors to faultless major maintenance tasks today without interacting with more citizen from the continental U.S. The rapid changes in technology have made it Potential for this interaction to happen at a distance. These changes have created an environment that requires organizations to be more agile where the Navy's strategy and structure must be permanently reassessed. Agreeing to Hughes and Beatty (2005) "The best way for organizations to thrive in the face of this new reality is to come to be continual studying engines (p. 2). This also means that more sailors will be engaged in strategic planning. An agile and flexible arrival ensures that citizen at all organizational levels, which affect the direction and momentum of the organization, have the proper understanding of the whole organization.
The transformation of America's naval troops must be a continuous process, one that includes changes in the way we train, educate and hire our people; the way we make and equip our war fighting formations; and the processes by which we distinguish and make the naval capabilities that will be needed by hereafter joint forces. At its core, transformation is based on a willingness to permanently challenge old reasoning and introduce new concepts. Most foremost are the processes that are put in place to institutionalize a culture that promotes and rewards the introduction of new concepts and thinking.
The operational make and architectural framework for Naval Warfare in the information Age will be to consolidate sailors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force, scalable over the spectrum of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land. This framework provides indispensable shared direction, guiding principles, and projected evolutionary objectives for the Navy and nautical Corps development of hereafter capabilities, to ensure Naval troops will be ready in the hereafter protection environment. Network centric Warfare will serve as a vital and indispensable bridge between the Surflant mission and the capabilities that the Navy must make to ensure U.S. National protection goals are met.
References
Alberts, D. S. And Hayes, R. E. (2003). Power to the Edge: Command and control in the information Age. Washington, D.C. DoD Command and control research Program.
Galbraith, J. R. (2002). Designing Organizations" An Executives Guide to Strategy, Structure, and Process. San Francisco, Ca. Jossey-Bass.
Hughes, Richard and Beatty, Katherine (2005). Becoming a Strategic Leader: Your Role in Your Organization's Enduring Success. San Francisco, Ca : John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Johnson, S. E.; Libicki, M. C.; and Treverton, G. F. (2003). New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decision-making Monographs/reports. Santa Monica, Ca Rand Corporation.
McLaughlin, Janice. (1999). Valuing Technology: Organizations Culture and Change. London, Gbr. Routledge.
Nathman J. B. (24 March 1999). Statement of Rear Admiral John b. Nathman, Director Naval Air Warfare branch before the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Littoral Warefare in the 21st Century. Washington D.C. Navy Office of Information. Retrieved Electronically 23 May 2006 http:/www.news.navy.mil/navydata/testimony/seapower/nath0324.txt.
Olmstead, J. A. (2002). Creating the Fundamentally Competent Organization: An Open Systems Approach. Westport, Ct. Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated.
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